Rehabilitation and social behavior: experiments in prison by Balafoutas, Loukas et al.
Games and Economic Behavior 119 (2020) 148–171Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Games and Economic Behavior
www.elsevier.com/locate/geb
Rehabilitation and social behavior: Experiments in prison
Loukas Balafoutas a,∗, Aurora García-Gallego b, Nikolaos Georgantzis b,c, 
Tarek Jaber-Lopez a, Evangelos Mitrokostas d,e
a Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Austria
b LEE & Department of Economics, University Jaume I, Spain
c Burgundy School of Business – School of Wine & Spirits Business, Dijon, France
d Department of Economics and Finance, University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom
e The Hellenic Open University, Greece
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 20 May 2018










Despite the economic and social significance of crime reduction and criminals’ rehabilita-
tion, research evaluating the effects of incarceration on behavior is surprisingly scarce. We 
conduct an experiment with 105 prison inmates and complement it with administrative 
data in order to explore several aspects of their social behavior. We first perform 
a comprehensive analysis of behavior in three economic games, finding evidence of 
discrimination against a sample from outside prison. In addition, our regression analysis 
reveals that inmates generally become less pro-social towards this out-group the longer 
they remain incarcerated. Finally, we introduce and evaluate a priming intervention that 
asks inmates to reflect on their time spent in prison. This intervention has a very sizeable 
and significant impact, increasing pro-sociality towards the out-group. Hence, a simple, 
low-cost intervention of this sort can have desirable effects in promoting rehabilitation 
and integration into social and economic life after release.
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC 
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Fighting crime is among the priorities for any country’s internal affairs. Crime is not only detrimental in terms of more 
insecurity and a lowering of a country’s social capital, but it also represents a high direct monetary cost to society. For 
instance, in the United States, the annual cost of crime is estimated in 3 trillion US dollars (Anderson, 2012). The number 
of incarcerated people in the world is more than 10 million, with more than 2.2 million in the US. In terms of prison 
population rates, in the US and in Western European countries there are 698 and 84 prisoners per 100,000 of national 
population, respectively. Overall, the world prison population has increased by around 20% since 2000 (Walmsley, 2016). 
This increase is driven by Central (over 80%) and South America (145%) and to a lesser extent by the US (14%), while 
a decreasing pattern (by 21%) is seen in Europe. It is also important to highlight the huge recidivism rates, which may 
explain part of the overall increasing rates for crime. US data show a non-encouraging recidivist pattern: around two-thirds 
of ex-convicts were rearrested within three years, and three-quarters within five years. Among those who were rearrested 
within five years, 36.8% were arrested within the first six months (Durose et al., 2014).
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and to examine ways to promote their rehabilitation and re-integration into social and economic life. As a matter of fact, 
rehabilitation and social reintegration are – along with retributive justice and deterrence – among the main objectives 
of modern penal systems. According to the European Court of Human Rights, ‘while punishment remains one of the aims of 
imprisonment, the emphasis in European penal policy is now on the rehabilitative aim of imprisonment’.1 But how successful are 
prison sentences in fostering pro-social behavior and promoting the future integration of inmates into social and economic 
life? The debate among criminologists about whether prisons have a positive effect on deterring inmates’ criminal behavior 
remains unresolved. Generally speaking, different schools of thought have expressed contradictory points of view in this 
regard (Gendreau et al., 1999). The first one is optimistic and claims that, in line with the concepts of specific and general 
deterrence, prison sentences suppress criminal behavior. In support of this view and in particular specific deterrence, recent 
evidence from Norway points towards a preventive effect of time spent in prison on subsequent criminal activity and 
recidivism by individuals and within their family and criminal network (Bhuller et al., 2016, 2018). The second goes in 
the exact opposite direction, claiming that prisons promote criminality given the psychologically destructive and inhumane 
conditions (Chen and Shapiro, 2007) and the possibility of acquiring new criminal skills from one’s fellow inmates (Bayer et 
al., 2009). Hence, the discussion over the effect of prisons on inmates remains open.2 In any case, more work is needed to 
understand inmates’ social behavior in order to design effective policies to prevent or rehabilitate criminals.
While this paper is not equipped to provide a conclusive answer on how prison sentences affect behavior, it contributes 
to this discussion by measuring important aspects of inmates’ social behavior and by evaluating a simple intervention aimed 
at increasing pro-sociality. We present evidence from a series of experiments based on questionnaires and simple games 
that have been extensively used in the economic literature in order to extract various aspects of social behavior, namely the 
Trust Game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and the Equality Equivalence Test that elicits social preference types (henceforth TG, 
PD, and EET, respectively). The experimental design allows us to address the following topics, which can be informative to 
the relationship between imprisonment and social behavior: First, we perform a comprehensive analysis of inmates’ social 
behavior along the dimensions of pro- and anti-social distributional preferences, trust and reciprocity, and cooperation. 
Second, we search for parochial altruism and intergroup discrimination by comparing the behavior of prison inmates towards 
the in-group (other inmates) and the out-group (a sample from outside the prison). We believe this is particularly important, 
given that successful rehabilitation and re-integration will require inmates to interact with the out-of-prison population 
in the future: in that sense, discriminatory behavior against the (current) out-group can be worrisome and indicative of 
unfavorable attitudes towards the general population. Finally, our study introduces and evaluates a simple psychological 
priming method at the beginning of the experimental sessions with the aim of activating a positive rehabilitation effect: 
we ask inmates to reflect on their time spent in prison and on how it has affected them. The idea behind this intervention 
is that inmates may be driven to think about the rehabilitative purpose of imprisonment and maybe express through their 
decisions in the experimental games a desire or a commitment to become ‘better persons’.
Our methodology consists of a lab-in-the-field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) with a non-standard subject pool of 
105 prison inmates from two prisons, a low and a high-security one, in Chania, Greece. We complement our experimental 
data with administrative and survey data on prison inmates. Our choice of games (TG, PD, EET) is motivated by the fact that 
the elicited facets of pro-sociality are essential in the time after release for prison and keys to a successful rehabilitation. 
Trust and reciprocity are of particular importance, not only in social relationships, but also for professional relationships 
that are commonly based on mutually beneficial gift-exchange (Akerlof, 1982; Fehr et al., 1997). Similarly, many jobs require 
workers to cooperate with each other in teams, and cooperation has been put forward as the most essential and defining 
feature for the organization of modern societies. Importantly, economic experiments have demonstrated that cooperation 
rates measured in standard economic games correlate with actual behavior in the field (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Gneezy 
et al., 2016). Finally, distributional preferences elicited in the EET – such as altruism or inequality aversion – have obvious 
implications for successful social exchange, but can also affect domains such as workplace behavior (Putterman, 2006;
Rotemberg, 2006) or voting decisions (Fisman et al., 2017).
The literature in experimental economics studying the behavior of inmates, outlined in the next section, is surprisingly 
limited. Personality inventories and interviews have been extensively used by psychologists and criminologists to assess 
certain aspects of prisoners’ personality and individual attitudes (Toch, 1977). However, their social preferences and behavior 
in interaction within a social group have not been elicited in a systematic and controlled way in incentive compatible 
contexts where inmates could interact either with each other or with non-institutionalized subjects. Moreover, we are 
aware of almost no controlled economic experiments sharing our aims of assessing the effect of prison sentences on various 
1 See Vinter [GC], supra n 1 at para 115. Here the Grand Chamber referred to Dickson v United Kingdom, supra n 35 at para 75; and Boulois v Luxembourg
ECHR Reports 2012; 55 EHRR 32 at para 83.
2 Some related empirical work has been carried out and provides evidence on the relationship between prison conditions and recidivism (Roodman, 2017;
Villettaz et al., 2014). For instance, it has been shown in Drago et al. (2011) that prison severity does not reduce the probability of recidivism. Instead, 
it seems that harsh prison conditions increase post-release criminal activity. Further work finds little correlation between the length of sentences and 
employment or income (Toch, 1977; Needels, 1996). Experiments have been also conducted in prison to study the criminogenic and anti-social behavior 
of prisoners as well as the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs (e.g., Farrington and Welsh, 2005; Lipsey and Cullen, 2007). Finally, a few controlled 
experiments evaluate the effect of prison sentences on outcomes such as employment or re-offense rates, by comparing short-term imprisonment against 
community service (Killias et al., 2000, 2010).
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of fostering a positive rehabilitation effect such as our priming intervention. One exception is a recent paper examining 
preference stability by evaluating the effect of participation in an ‘offender accountability program’ aimed at promoting 
pro-social behavior in a sample of Californian inmates (Maggioni et al., 2018). The findings indicate that participation in 
this ten-month long program increased trust (but not altruism), hence providing an example of a successful intervention in 
the direction of rehabilitation.3
Our results reveal that inmates exhibit some degree of discrimination in their behavior: they are significantly less re-
ciprocal and less cooperative towards the out-group (people from outside the prison) than towards the in-group (other 
inmates). However, discrimination is not present in the sample of inmates that experienced our priming intervention, be-
cause the intervention has a very large and statistically significantly positive effect on pro-sociality towards the out-group 
in the domains of trust, reciprocity, and cooperation. These findings suggest that a simple, low-cost intervention based on 
encouraging prison inmates to reflect on their incarceration may be an effective tool to promote rehabilitation and a more 
successful integration into social and economic life after release from prison. This intervention could easily be integrated 
into, e.g., counseling sessions routinely offered to prison inmates by trained psychologists or social workers. Furthermore, 
the regression analysis allows us to gain some insights on how the time spent in prison affects pro-sociality: we find that 
longer time spent in prison is associated with lower cooperation rates towards the out-group, lower benevolence when 
lying ahead of another participant regardless of group, and stronger reciprocity towards the in-group. These findings can be 
useful when assessing the rehabilitation effect of prison sentences.
2. Literature review
2.1. Economic experiments in prisons
Prison inmates are a population that has only recently attracted the interest of experimental economic research, and only 
to a very limited extent. Running economic experiments in prisons can be challenging, as it requires complicated logistics. 
However, we believe that economists and behavioral scientists have a word to say on the topics we focus on here, and that 
insights from controlled experiments can be of major importance for criminologists and policy makers. In this section we 
present some related literature on the topics of social behavior among prisoners, priming, and ostracism.
Existing studies have mainly focused their attention on describing the social behavior of inmates. Using a dictator game, 
Birkeland et al. (2014) find no significant differences in altruism and no evidence of discrimination between criminals and 
non-criminals. Additionally, in an internet experiment, these authors do not find any difference in the pro-social behavior 
between people with a criminal record and people without. The authors claim that pro-social motivation captured by the 
dictator game is not a sufficient component to explain criminal propensity. Similarly, Chmura et al. (2010) find no significant 
difference in the propensity to give in a dictator game between prisoners and an average group of subjects. Those prisoners 
who attend prison school are less likely than the control group to share their endowment, but if they do share it, they give 
considerably more. Particularly those inmates who have the better marks and especially those who improve their marks over 
time are those who give more. To some extent contradicting the above findings, Chmura et al. (2016) find that prisoners give 
more than students in a dictator game and they give more to charity than to another prisoner. Our findings complement 
these studies since we use a new method to elicit distributional preferences, which does not rely on a one-dimensional 
index of pro-social motivation, but instead uses a choice list in order to classify decision makers into different types (for 
more details on this method, see section 3).
On the topic of cooperative behavior, Khadjavi and Lange (2013) compare female inmates to a sample of students in a 
simultaneous and a sequential prisoner’s dilemma. Interestingly, in the simultaneous version inmates cooperate more than 
students do. Clark et al. (2015) run four cooperative games in the US. They compare their behavior to a sample of the general 
population. Overall, their results show that offenders make lower offers in the ultimatum game, cooperate less in the PD, 
display lower trust and reciprocity in the trust game and make lower contributions in the public good game.4 Nese et al.
(2018) run an experiment in order to provide evidence on cooperation and response to sanctions among different types of 
criminals. They conduct a PD and a third-party punishment game with three different samples: students, ‘ordinary criminals’ 
and Camorristi (Neapolitan ‘Mafiosi’). Their results show that Camorra prisoners have a high degree of cooperativeness and 
a strong tendency to punish free-riders, as well as a clear rejection of the imposition of external rules even at significant 
cost to themselves. Ordinary criminals are the least cooperative group of participants in this study, lagging behind Camorra 
prisoners as well as students. On the other hand, ordinary criminals and Camorristi punish more than students in the 
third-party punishment game.
Khadjavi (2015) tests the effectiveness of deterrence in a German prison by conducting two treatments of the so-called 
Stealing Game. In the first treatment, subjects have the option to steal without consequences, whereas in the second treat-
3 An interesting literature in criminology has used randomized trials in order to evaluate several kinds of interventions (such as boot camps, cognitive-
behavioral interventions, and therapeutic programs for drug addicts and sex offenders) aimed at improving correctional outcomes and reducing recidivism 
rates. These interventions have generally been found to produce at best modest results. A summary is provided in Farrington and Welsh (2005).
4 It must be noted, however, that the procedures do not meet the standards of experimental economics since subjects did not know the identity of the 
other player who in the end turned out to be the experimenter.
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they face the possibility of punishment, suggesting that deterrence can mitigate stealing behavior. Overall, the studies dis-
cussed above suggest that inmates exhibit a largely similar social behavior to that of students or groups drawn from the 
general population in non-strategic settings such as the purely distributional choice in the dictator game, while behavior in 
more interactive games differs to varying degrees.
An interesting recent study by Cohn et al. (2015b) uses the coin tossing task (Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011) in a Swiss 
prison to study the effect of priming on inmates’ ethical behavior. The results show that inmates cheat more when they 
are primed by making their criminal identity salient. The authors contrast this result with a control group of non-criminals 
where they do not find an effect of priming. Hence, criminals are found to behave differently when their criminal iden-
tity is activated. Moreover, Cohn et al. (2015b) show that cheating rates in the experiment correlate with the number 
of disciplinary offences in prison, lending strong support to the external relevance of the experimental findings and the 
methodology used.
2.2. Priming
Economists have in recent years increasingly adopted priming techniques that are commonly used in psychology experi-
ments.5 Priming consists of subtly activating certain mental reminders to manipulate subsequent decisions by experimental 
participants (Bargh and Chartrand, 2000). The most common priming methods used by economists include questionnaire 
content manipulation, word unscrambling tasks, paragraph reading, background images, norm salience using a confederate, 
counting tasks, visual or audio cues, or writing a paragraph on a given topic. To give a few examples, Cohn et al. (2015a)
primed financial professionals with either a boom or a bust scenario. In treatment ‘Boom’ subjects saw an animated, fic-
tive chart of a booming stock market while in the bust condition they saw a chart corresponding to the bursting of a 
bubble. Cohn et al. (2014) primed bankers by using questionnaires that made their professional identity salient; the ques-
tionnaire method was also used in the paper by Cohn et al. (2015b) run in Swiss prisons and discussed earlier. Shariff and 
Norenzayan (2007) as well as Benjamin et al. (2016) used a word unscrambling task in order to induce a religious prime. 
Gino et al. (2009) primed participants by making cheating appear as a salient social norm. Some studies have found that 
using subtle cues that make subjects feel observed increases pro-sociality (Bateson et al., 2006; Haley and Fessler, 2005;
Ekström, 2012), while others (such as Fehr and Schneider, 2010) have failed to find an effect. Andersson et al. (2017) used 
subliminal messages of a pro-social prime and found an increase in donations to charity. Vohs et al. (2006) primed subjects 
with reminders of money, which led them to request less help and to be less helpful towards others. Callen et al. (2014)
conducted an experiment on risk decision in Afghanistan, priming subjects by asking them to recall and recount fearful 
experiences.
2.3. Ostracism
We finally mention a few economic experiments that have studied the effect of ostracism in social dilemmas. This 
literature is related to our work because imprisonment can be seen as a form of ostracism: criminals are excluded from 
social life and deprived of their rights and social benefits for a certain period of time. This strand of the literature has 
mainly focused on the effect of the threat of exclusion on cooperation and contribution to public good games (Masclet, 2003;
Cinyabuguma et al., 2005; Kerr et al., 2009; Sheremeta et al., 2011; Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010). Overall, the results provide 
evidence that the threat of exclusion reduces free-riding behavior. Other studies have focused on the type of exclusion, 
i.e., whether it is irreversible (Cinyabuguma et al., 2005; Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010) or whether subjects are free to move 
immediately to another group (Charness and Yang, 2014).
More closely related to our work, the lab experiment of Solda and Villeval (2017) analyses the behavior of excluded 
members, after their reintegration, into a public goods game. Subjects are excluded for a determined period of time and 
not irreversibly. The authors manipulate the possible length of exclusion and whether this is determined exogenously or 
as a result of a vote. As in the aforementioned studies, subjects typically exclude the less cooperative group members. 
After reintegration, excluded members increase cooperation rates and compliance with the group norm but only when the 
exclusion is imposed for a short period of time, endogenously chosen by vote. Hence, a short duration of exclusion can be 
advantageous in promoting reintegration. This result is particularly interesting for us, since it concurs with our finding that 
a longer time spent in prison is associated with lower pro-sociality towards the out-group.
3. Experimental design and hypotheses
Our experimental design is based on three simple games, supplemented by collection of sociodemographic data, ques-
tions related to inmates’ experience inside the prison and data provided by the prison administration.
5 For a review on priming in economics, see also Cohn and Maréchal (2016).
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TG: We use a discrete version of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995). Subjects are matched in groups of two and have the 
role of either player 1 (the sender) or player 2 (the receiver). The game is sequential with player 1 as first mover and player 
2 as second mover. The sender has two strategies, to trust or not to trust player 2. If he decides not to trust, the game ends 
and both players earn 10 euros. If the sender decides to trust, then the game continues and player 2 has to decide whether 
to reciprocate or not. If he decides to reciprocate they both earn 20 euros, while if he decides not to reciprocate player 
1 earns 5 euros and player 2 earns 35 euros. Given this design we are able to classify subjects in the role of player 1 as 
trusting or not trusting, and subjects in the role of player 2 as reciprocal (trustworthy) or not reciprocal (not trustworthy).6
For self-regarding, money maximizing subjects the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction in this game is straightforward. 
Reciprocating reduces the receiver’s payoff; hence, the receiver will never reciprocate. Anticipating this, senders will not 
trust initially. On the contrary, the Pareto efficient solution that provides the highest payoffs is that player 1 trusts and 
player 2 reciprocates.
In our experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to the sender’s or the receiver’s role. We implemented the game in 
a simultaneous rather than in a sequential form, as follows: senders had to indicate whether they trusted the receiver or 
not, while at the same time receivers had to indicate whether they wanted to reciprocate in case the sender had decided 
to trust them. This strategy method ensured that we collected data on the reciprocity of all subjects who were assigned to 
the role of the receiver.
PD: We use the same version of the simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma as Khadjavi and Lange (2013): Two players si-
multaneously decide either to cooperate with the other player or to defect. Assuming selfish own money maximization, 
the dominant strategy for both players is to defect and, therefore, the unique Nash equilibrium predicts mutual defection, 
yielding payoffs of 3 euros to both. If both players cooperate the payoffs are 7 euros to each player, which Pareto dominates 
the Nash equilibrium. If the players choose different strategies, the defector obtains 9 euros while the cooperator obtains 1 
euro.
EET: The Equality Equivalence Test (Kerschbamer, 2015) elicits distributional preference types. Each subject has to make 
ten binary choices between allocations that both involve an own payoff for the decision maker and a payoff for a randomly 
matched anonymous second subject. In each of the ten binary decision problems, one of the two allocations is symmetric 
– i.e., egalitarian, giving the same payoff to each person – while the other leads to unequal payoffs for the two subjects. 
The ten choices are shown in Table 1, which breaks them down into a so-called disadvantageous inequality block and an 
advantageous inequality block, depending on whether inequality is to the advantage or disadvantage of the decision maker. 
In both blocks the symmetric payoff and the payoff of the second subject are held constant, while the payoff of the decision 
maker increases in steps of 40 cents. Given this design, in each of the two blocks a rational decision maker switches at 
most once from the symmetric to the asymmetric allocation (and never in the other direction).
Based on the choices in this task each subject reveals information about his or her benevolence in the domains of 
disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. We use a simple coding procedure that assigns values from −2.5 to +2.5 (in 
steps of 0.5) to revealed benevolence in each domain, with higher values corresponding to higher benevolence. Benevolence 
in the domain of disadvantageous inequality is thus measured by the so-called ‘x-score’ and benevolence in the domain 
of advantageous inequality by the so-called ‘y-score’. Based on these values, we can also classify each subject into one of 
four distinct behavioral types. In particular, a decision maker who is benevolent in both domains is classified as an altruist; 
a decision maker who is benevolent when ahead but malevolent when behind is classified as inequality averse (IAV); a 
decision maker who is malevolent in both domains is classified as spiteful, and a decision maker who is benevolent when 
lying behind but malevolent when lying ahead is classified as inequality loving.7
3.2. Identity and in-group out-group effects
The term identity is used here as an individual’s self-perception regarding his or her main characteristic(s) which define(s) 
them as a person. In general, identity may be driven by a person’s individual features (such as a family history8) and 
exceptional endowments or achievements (the tallest man in the world, the best student in class, feeling of supernatural 
or paranormal sensations, etc.), or by a feeling of belonging to a particular group (national, religious, linguistic, racial, 
geographical, consumption of a common brand, etc.).9
6 It should be noted that splitting the surplus may be due to several reasons. It can indicate reciprocal behavior or a desire to reward trust, but it can 
also be driven by altruism or inequality aversion on part of the second mover. For thorough discussions on other-regarding motivations in the trust game 
see Cox (2004), Isoni and Sugden (in press). We are not able to identify the motivations driving the first- and second mover’s behavior in the trust game, 
not least because we did not elicit participants’ beliefs in the experiment.
7 For more details on the precise way in which benevolence and malevolence towards the second subject are defined and measured we refer to 
Kerschbamer (2015). Note that, according to the classification used here, selfish subjects are a subset of the four other categories. An alternative classifica-
tion method would include selfish subjects in addition to those classified as strictly altruistic, inequality averse, or inequality loving. Using this alternative 
classification does not change any of our main findings; details are available upon request.
8 See, for example, Phelan and Rustichini (2018).
9 Literally, “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1974, p. 69).
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The Equality Equivalence Test (EET).
Benevolence behind
LEFT RIGHT
You get Another person gets You get Another person gets
3.2 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
3.6 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
4 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
4.4 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
4.8 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
Benevolence ahead
LEFT RIGHT
You get Another person gets You get Another person gets
3.2 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
3.6 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
4 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
4.4 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
4.8 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
One manifestation of group identity may be in-group or parochial favoritism, understood as the tendency to favor 
members of one’s own group over those in other groups (Everett et al., 2015). In fact, the discrimination comes from 
two independent but possibly co-evolving tendencies, namely, cooperation within and competition between groups (Rusch, 
2014). Based on this reasoning, we derive our first testable hypothesis:
H1: Inmates discriminate against the out-of-prison sample.
This hypothesis relies upon the assumption that a prisoner’s identity is salient among the prison sample. As we will 
show in section 4.2, this is indeed the case. However, we must mention that differences between the inmates’ in- and 
out-group behavior could also be due to things that are unrelated to group membership, such as differences in perceived 
income or deservingness.
In order to test H1, we let participants in our experiment make their decisions in each game under two conditions in a 
within-subjects design. In the in-group condition, prison inmates know that they are matched with another inmate, while in 
the out-group condition inmates know that the partner is someone from outside the prison. Non-institutionalized subjects 
know that in the in-group condition the partner is someone from the same school, while in the out-group condition the 
partner is someone who is in prison. We control for order effects by randomizing the order in which participants make 
their decisions for the in-group and the out-group. Asking participants to decide twice and varying the partner’s identity 
has been used by several studies on discrimination (see, e.g. Birkeland et al., 2014; Chen and Li, 2009; Romano et al., 2017), 
and an advantage of this design choice is that it allows us to study our research question with the full sample size and 
without compromising statistical power. However, this methodology also faces limitations, and it can be criticized for being 
prone to experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010).10
3.3. Priming
In a between-subjects design, inmates are randomly assigned to either the neutral (control) or the priming treatment. 
In the priming treatment, participants are asked to write a piece of text on the following topic: “Reflect on your time spent 
in prison, tell us how it has affected your social behavior”. In the neutral treatment, inmates write a paragraph based on the 
following: “Reflect on an activity you like, tell us how it has affected your life”. The procedures are very simple: at the beginning 
of each session and before making their decisions in the subsequent economic games (TG, PD, EET), subjects receive a sheet 
with the corresponding text and a blank space to write the paragraph.11
In such a context, group reputation concerns are likely to emerge and affect individual behavior, in a similar way in 
which social dilemmas emerge from the conflict between the common and the private interest. Everett et al. (2015) argue 
that a person who identifies with a group may act in a way resembling a social dilemma, where the public good may 
be the group’s reputation. Interestingly, it has been shown (Hopkins et al., 2007) that, in the name of his or her group’s 
reputation, a subject may choose more cooperative actions towards the out-group in order to induce out-group members to 
see in-group members in a more positive way. This argument motivates our second testable hypothesis:
10 In this respect it is worthwhile noting that administration in both prisons has confirmed to us that the inmates have had no previous experience with 
research studies inside the facility, thus reducing the risk that they are familiar with experimental procedures and hypotheses.
11 We implement the priming manipulation only with the sample of prison inmates, given that the priming condition requires participants to reflect on 
and give an account of their time spent in prison: this would not be a reasonable task for students who have never been imprisoned.
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neutral treatment.
This hypothesis rests on the assumption that priming increases the salience of the prisoner’s identity. In section 4.2 we 
will present evidence in support of this assumption.
We have conducted a post-experimental content analysis of the inmates’ accounts in the priming treatment, in order to 
form an impression of the nature of these accounts. In particular, we asked two independent research assistants who were 
blind to our hypotheses to code each account as conveying a generally positive, generally negative, or neutral message. The 
codings of the two assistants are very highly correlated (Kendall’s τ = 0.66, p < 0.01; tau-equivalent reliability = 0.80) and 
reveal strong differences between the neutral and primed group.12 While the large majority of accounts (35 of 47, or 74.5%) 
in the neutral group were coded as neutral in terms of content, neutral accounts represent only 25.9% of the total (14 of 
54) in the primed group. This difference is statistically significant (χ2 = 23.71, p < 0.01, N = 101) and supports the validity 
of our priming tool, by showing that we have indeed succeeded in creating a neutral group against which the effect of the 
priming instrument can be evaluated.
To summarize, subjects have to decide sequentially in six games: TG in-group, TG out-group, PD in-group, PD out-group, 
EET in-group, and EET out-group. Therefore, we conduct three economic games in a 2 x 2 factorial design combining the 
in-group vs. out-group manipulation (within-subjects) and the neutral vs. priming manipulation (between-subjects). Note 
that we randomly assigned participants as either player 1 (trustor) or player 2 (trustee) in the TG, which resulted in 59 
inmates in the role of player 1 and 46 as player 2.
3.4. Questionnaires
After making their decisions in the TG, PD and EET, inmates were asked to fill out a questionnaire about their nationality, 
age, marital status, education level, and number of siblings (see Appendix B). Additionally, we asked them to answer ques-
tions regarding the conditions of their imprisonment: time spent in the current prison, number of times imprisoned, total 
time spent in prison during their life, type and length of sentence, attendance of religious activities in prison, number of cell 
mates, frequency of leaving the prison (for any reason) and number of working days per month. The prison administration 
provided us with this same information, allowing us to double check and correct for minor discrepancies.
3.5. Procedures with institutionalized subjects
All sessions were run in two male prisons in Chania, Greece. In November 2016 we ran one session in the high security 
prison facility “Crete 1” and two simultaneous sessions in the low security agricultural prison facility of “Agia”. In April 
2017 we conducted an additional session in the low security prison. We recruited a total of 105 volunteer male inmates 
by posting announcements in several languages (Greek, English, Arabic and French), around the prison premises to invite 
inmates to participate in the experiment. Additionally, two days before each session, the experimenters went to the prison to 
answer possible questions and give a short explanation of what is an economic experiment. Once they decided to participate, 
inmates had to register through the prison administration.
In the high security prison, the single session was conducted in the library (N = 14). In the low security prison, the two 
simultaneous sessions were run in the library and in the gym (N = 31 and N = 12, respectively), and the last session was 
run only in the library (N = 48). No guards were present during the sessions and we insisted on and guaranteed subjects 
about anonymity, by giving them a random number so there was no way to associate a decision with a name.13 We were 
very cautious in minimizing any kind of audience effects.
The experiment was conducted with pencil and paper. Subjects could choose among four different languages for their 
booklet of instructions: Greek, English, Arabic or French.14 We enforced the usual experimental practice of not allowing for 
communication among subjects and ensuring anonymity in decision making. For that purpose, we had subjects sit in big 
12 The content analysis has been conducted for 101 out of 105 inmates’ accounts, since four accounts were illegible. In all cases of disagreement (N = 24), 
the two coders had to meet and decide on a common coding.
13 The administration was in charge of creating a double blind process between the experimentalists and the inmates. The reason to have this blind pro-
cess was not only to ensure anonymity in the experimental procedure, but also to comply with the regulations of the penitentiary center. Each participant 
was given a random number, which was written in his booklet set. Once the inmate finished filling out the booklet and before leaving the laboratory, he 
announced his random number to the administration, who recorded the number and associated it to the corresponding person. Afterwards, the admin-
istration provided us with additional data associated to each number. In this way we were only able to match a random number to the administrative 
data and experimental choices. Moreover, we did not provide information on inmates’ experimental choices to the administration, to ensure anonymity 
between inmates and administration in this dimension and to respect inmates’ privacy. This procedure was clearly explained to inmates, to ensure that 
their decisions were made free of any concerns about lack of privacy or anonymity.
14 Instructions in languages other than English were translated from English by native speakers. In Table A.1 (Appendix A) we show how many inmates 
chose to receive the instructions in each language. That table also shows the distribution of languages in which inmates completed the priming task. Six 
subjects chose to complete the task in a language other than Greek, English, Arabic and French. We note that our research team made sure that every 
participant understood the instructions, and to the best of our knowledge there were no cases where language posed a threat on understanding. Sample 
instructions can be found in Appendix B.
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and languages of instructions to make communication and copying even less likely.
Once the session was ready to start, one of the experimenters explained aloud the general instructions of the experiment 
and answered possible questions. We stressed that the experiment was incentive compatible, meaning that participants 
would be paid with real money based on their decisions. Subjects were told that one game would be chosen randomly by 
the social worker at the end of the session. All the participants were invited to assist to the random draw of the game as 
witnesses. Given that inmates are not allowed to receive money directly, we explained to them that their payment would 
be credited to their personal prison account, which can be used to buy goods inside the prison (e.g., in the cafeteria).
Afterwards, the experiment started and participants were asked to keep silent until the end of the session. We random-
ized the order in which the PD and TG were presented and played, although we kept the EET always as the third game. 
The instructions for each game were read in silent by each subject and they could go through the booklet at their own 
pace. Before proceeding to the three games, all participants had to complete the priming task by writing the corresponding 
piece of text. Three experimenters were present in each session in order to answer any question in private and to assist 
participants. Whenever participants had finished filling out their booklet of instructions (including the priming text, the 
three games, and the questionnaires), they were allowed to leave the session.15 We executed the payments one day later, 
after randomly matching the decisions of the participants and calculating the resulting payoffs.
3.6. Procedures with non-institutionalized subjects
The non-institutionalized subjects were recruited in the Mediterranean Agronomic Institute of Chania (MAICH) also lo-
cated in Chania, Greece. This is a boarding school in which students spend most of their time in a closed environment, 
hence they attend lectures, eat and sleep in the school, and typically share rooms with other students. We ran one session 
with 40 volunteer students from different degrees in November 2016. The procedures were as similar as possible to the 
ones followed in prison. Each subject had a booklet (in English, since this is the language of instruction at the school) with 
a different order between PD and TG and with different orders for the in-group and the out-group decision. Each subject 
was assigned a random number to ensure anonymity. One of the experimenters explained aloud the general instructions and 
answered possible questions. Afterwards, all subjects went alone through the different games and questionnaires. Similarly, 
subjects were aware that only one game would be randomly chosen at the end of the session to determine their earnings.16
It is important to acknowledge that the sample of non-institutionalized participants differs to prison inmates along several 
dimensions, such as gender and age composition, educational background and socioeconomic background. The main pur-
pose of collecting data from this sample is thus not to make direct comparisons between the behavior of the two samples, 
but rather to create an out-group that is used for matching purposes in the experiment. Nevertheless, for completeness, in 
Appendix A we show how the behavior of our focus group of inmates compares to that of students.
4. Results
We present our results in three subsections. We first describe our sample. Second, we show a landscape of subjects’ 
social behavior and study in-group-out-group bias among inmates by documenting the differences in their social behavior 
when they are matched with another inmate versus with someone from outside prison. Third, we demonstrate the effect of 
the priming intervention on inmates’ social behavior.
4.1. The sample
In the following analysis we pool the data from the low and the high security prisons, given that no significant differ-
ences in decisions were found between the two samples in any of the three experimental games. Our sample is composed 
of 145 subjects in total, 105 of whom are male inmates and 40 (25 female and 15 male) are subjects from the student 
group. Among the 105 inmates, 57 participated in the priming treatment and 48 in the neutral treatment. 59 inmates were 
randomly assigned to the role of player 1 and 46 the role of player 2 in the trust game.
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for the sample of prison inmates. In the upper panel of the table we provide 
information on the type of crime committed, classifying crimes into eight categories as recorded – and provided to us – 
by the prison administration: Drug related offences, robbery, smuggling goods, human trafficking, homicide, sexual crime, 
economic crime, firearms violations. Note that some inmates have been sentenced for two or more crimes. The variable 
Penalty (also provided by prison authorities) captures the total sentence in years. We also collected some information 
regarding inmates’ living conditions in prison, including: Frequency of getting out of the facility (measured in days per 
month), number of people they share a cell with, number of days per month that they work inside the facility, and average 
number of visits per month. Finally, the lower panel of the table provides information about sociodemographic variables 
15 We note that all participants completed all parts of the experiment and none left a session before doing so.
16 Given that the number of subjects was higher in the prison than in the student sample, we matched each student to two or three prisoners in order 
to calculate payoffs. However, for each student we only paid out one of the matchings.
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Descriptive statistics for the sample of inmates.
Full sample Neutral treatment Priming treatment
Variable N Rel. freq. Std. dev. N Rel. freq. Std. dev. N Rel. freq. Std. dev. p-Value
Type of sentence
Drug related 43 0.41 0.49 19 0.40 0.49 24 0.42 0.50 0.79
Robbery 36 0.34 0.48 18 0.38 0.49 18 0.32 0.47 0.52
Smuggling goods 6 0.06 0.23 3 0.06 0.24 3 0.05 0.22 0.83
Human trafficking 13 0.12 0.33 5 0.10 0.31 8 0.14 0.35 0.57
Homicide 7 0.07 0.25 2 0.04 0.20 5 0.09 0.28 0.35
Sexual crime 3 0.03 0.17 1 0.02 0.14 2 0.04 0.19 0.66
Economic crime 8 0.08 0.27 3 0.06 0.24 5 0.09 0.28 0.63
Firearms violations 7 0.07 0.25 4 0.08 0.28 3 0.05 0.22 0.53
Variable N Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev. p-Value
Sentence and prison conditions
Penalty 101 14.81 18.22 45 11.20 14.17 56 18.18 21.58 0.09
Time served 105 3.87 4.79 48 3.55 4.58 57 4.15 4.98 0.29
Frequency out 105 4.07 32.39 48 7.60 47.63 57 1.08 4.96 0.72
Cell shared 103 1.60 1.59 47 1.74 1.49 56 1.43 1.52 0.29
Work days 105 95.89 171.4 48 95.46 145.6 57 96.26 191.7 0.69
Visits 91 0.27 0.45 44 0.27 0.45 47 0.28 0.45 0.97
Sociodemographic variables
Age 105 35.95 9.40 48 33.65 8.60 57 38.00 9.68 0.02
Married 104 0.37 0.48 48 0.25 0.44 56 0.46 0.50 0.02
Siblings 104 4.83 4.15 47 4.57 2.88 57 5.04 4.98 0.58
Education 101 2.00 0.92 48 2.00 0.95 53 2.00 0.90 0.88
The upper panel reports relative frequencies of each type of crime in the subject pool. Note that frequencies do not add up to 1 
because some of the participants have two or more sentences. The lower panel reports means of selected variables. The p-values 
correspond to t-tests for continuous variables, and chi-squared tests for binary variables and Education, comparing Neutral with 
Priming treatment.
Fig. 1. Inmates’ decisions in the TG, broken down by behavior towards the in-group and out-group. Trust is measured as percentage of first movers who 
choose to trust in the TG; reciprocity is measured as percentage of second movers who choose to reciprocate in the TG. Bars include 95% confidence 
intervals.
including mean age, marital status, number of children, number of siblings, and the level of education (coded as 0: none; 1: 
elementary 2: secondary school; 3: high school; 4: university; 5: master). The table breaks down all variables between the 
neutral and priming group, and shows that our sample is quite balanced among the two treatments, albeit with a number 
of exceptions. In the regression analysis of section 5 we therefore control for a number of potentially relevant variables.
4.2. In-group-out-group bias: inmates’ parochialism and discrimination
In this section we test hypothesis H1, by providing a description of inmates’ behavior in the three experimental games 
and searching for parochialism and discrimination by comparing behavior towards the in-group (other inmates) and towards 
the out-group (people from outside prison). Fig. 1 shows trust and reciprocity rates in the TG. The levels of trust are very 
similar: 44.07% of inmates trust the in-group versus 40.68% who trust the out-group (McNemar χ2 = 0.02, p = 0.89, N =
118). On the other hand, we observe a large difference in terms of reciprocity, i.e., trustworthiness by second movers: 65.22% 
of them are reciprocal towards the in-group and split the available surplus, versus 30.43% who share with the out-group. 
This difference is significant (McNemar χ2 = 5.11, p = 0.02, N = 92) and indicates discrimination against the out-group.
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Fig. 3. Inmates’ classification of types (Spiteful, Altruistic, Inequality Averse, Inequality Loving) in the EET, broken down by behavior towards the in-group 
and out-group. Bars show the percentage of subjects classified into each type and include 95% confidence intervals.
Furthermore, we observe discrimination against the out-group in terms of cooperation. As shown in Fig. 2, 55.24% of 
inmates cooperate with other inmates, and only 31.43% cooperate with people from outside prison. The difference is statis-
tically significant (McNemar χ2 = 6.33, p = 0.01, N = 210).
Fig. 3 plots the distributional preference types among prisoners based on their decisions in the EET, again differentiating 
between decisions made to the in-group and to the out-group. Overall, we do not find any significant differences in this 
regard. 20% and 19.05% of inmates are spiteful when interacting with another inmate and with someone from outside 
the prison, respectively (McNemar χ2 = 0.001, p = 1.00, N = 210). 13.33% and 15.25% are altruistic with the in-group and 
out-group, respectively (McNemar χ2 = 0.03, p = 0.85, N = 210). Around one third are inequality averse when interacting 
with both groups (McNemar χ2 = 0.001, p = 1.00, N = 210). Similarly, around one third are inequality loving when they are 
matched with another inmate and with someone from outside the prison as well (McNemar χ2 = 0.01, p = 0.90, N = 210).
The very high prevalence of inequality loving types, accounting for 31.43% of the total, is a striking feature of the distribu-
tion of types. This rate is more than six times higher than among students (see Appendix A for details), and it is particularly 
noteworthy since previous studies that use the EET report very low frequencies of this behavioral type (Balafoutas et al., 
2012, 2014; Kerschbamer et al., 2017). A possible explanation for this result might be related to the hierarchical systems 
that commonly exist in prisons, meaning that inmates are used to being either in the role of the kiss-up or in the role of 
the boss, thereby increasing benevolence towards subjects lying ahead and decreasing benevolence towards those who are 
behind. However, since we cannot present evidence other than casual observation during the sessions to substantiate this 
claim, we restrict ourselves to simply documenting this interesting finding on the exceptionally high proportion of inequality 
loving types among prisoners.17
The aforementioned results partly support H1 and present novel evidence of discrimination from inmates in favor of their 
in-group and against their out-group, expressed by means of lower reciprocity and cooperation rates. On the other hand, 
17 A further potential explanation could be related to poor comprehension of the EET by inmates. In this respect, we first note that we took enough 
time to answer questions in private, and ensure understanding of all experimental games during the sessions to the extent possible. Moreover, we use the 
inmates’ level of education as a proxy for cognitive ability and perform a median split, comparing the distribution of types among inmates with above and 
below median educational attainment, failing to find significant differences between the two distributions. We also compute the correlation coefficients 
between education level and x- and y-scores and find that they are close to zero and insignificant (ρ = −0.08, p = 0.16; ρ = 0.07, p = 0.22, for x-scores 
and y-scores, respectively).
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Survey evidence on inmates’ identification with various groups.
N Mean St. Dev. Ethnical vs. religious Ethnical vs. prisoners Religious vs. prisoners
Ethnical group 48 3.45 1.64
Religious group 48 2.63 1.39
Prisoner group 48 3.56 1.59 z = 3.01 z = −0.49 z = −2.60
p < 0.01∗∗∗ p = 0.62 p < 0.01∗∗∗
Neutral treatment Priming treatment Ranksum M-W test across treatments
Ethnical group 3.62 3.29 z = 0.82, p = 0.41
Religious group 2.79 2.46 z = 0.55, p = 0.58
Prisoner group 2.96 4.17 z = −2.59, p < 0.01∗∗∗
Coding: 1 = I do not feel identified with this group, 5 = I definitely feel identified with this group.
we find no significant differences in trust rates or in the EET. This latter result is in line with Birkeland et al. (2014) who 
also find no evidence of in-group bias in the behavior of prisoners in a non-strategic context such as that of the dictator 
game (or the EET in our experiment).
Result 1: Inmates exhibit significantly less reciprocity and are less cooperative towards the out-group (i.e., people from outside the 
prison) than towards other inmates.
Hypothesis H1 rests on the assumption that prison inmates indeed perceive other inmates as an in-group, with which 
they feel identified. Moreover, H2 was motivated by means of stronger concerns for group reputation among primed in-
mates, which in turn suggests that group identification should be stronger in the primed group. In order to support these 
assumptions we present here evidence from a post-experimental questionnaire, which we conducted only in the second 
set of sessions in April 2017 (N = 48). In this questionnaire we asked inmates to indicate the extent to which they feel 
identified with each of three possible groups, including the ethnic and religious group and the group of prisoners. As shown 
in Table 3, identification was strongest with the prisoner group, followed closely by the ethnic group. Identifications with 
both groups were significantly stronger than with the religious group. These results confirm that being a prisoner is indeed 
a salient identity and our subjects perceive other inmates as their in-group. The lower panel of the table compares identifi-
cations across priming conditions: in line with the reasoning behind H2, the prisoner identity increases in strength among 
the primed inmates who are asked to reflect on their time spent in prison, while the other two identities do not differ 
significantly by treatment.
Regarding possible discriminatory behavior among the group of students, we find no evidence of discrimination in any 
of the dimensions in the experiment: students are equally trusting, reciprocal, cooperative, and benevolent towards their 
in-group of other students than towards their out-group of prison inmates, in the sense that we document no significant 
differences in any of these dimensions. Given that the focus of our work is on the behavior of inmates, we relegate to 
Appendix A the presentation of student behavior broken down by partner group (see Figs. A.4 to A.6).
4.3. Effects of the priming intervention
We begin the analysis of how priming affects inmates’ social behavior by comparing choices between the group of 
prisoners who were subjected to our priming intervention and those who participated in the neutral treatment. The analysis 
is shown in Fig. 4 and reveals a strong increase on inmates’ trust and reciprocity towards the out-group as a result of the 
priming intervention. Although priming has no significant effect on trust towards members of the in-group (χ2 = 0.22, p =
0.66, N = 59), it almost triples the percentage of inmates who trust members of the out-group (59.4% vs. 18.5%; χ2 =
10.13, p < 0.01, N = 59). Similarly, priming does not affect the levels of reciprocity towards the in-group (χ2 = 0.66, p =
0.42, N = 46), but it increases the level of reciprocity towards the out-group by a factor of more than three (44% vs. 14.3%; 
χ2 = 4.76, p = 0.03, N = 46).
This pattern is also present in the prisoner’s dilemma. Fig. 5 shows a non-significant effect of priming on cooperation 
towards the in-group (χ2 = 1.89, p = 0.17, N = 105), but a strong increase of cooperation towards the out-group (38.6% 
vs. 22.9%; χ2 = 2.98, p = 0.08, N = 105). Hence, hypothesis H2 is confirmed for the dimensions of trust, reciprocity, and 
cooperation.
On the contrary, the priming intervention seems to have no effect on distributional choices in the non-strategic context of 
the EET. Fig. 6 displays the distribution of types by comparing the subjects in the neutral and in the priming treatment. All 
comparisons are insignificant, with the partial exception of a lower fraction of inequality loving types towards the in-group 
(41.7% vs. 24.6%; χ2 = 3.48, p = 0.06, N = 105).18
18 χ2 tests also confirm that the distributions of types do not differ significantly by priming condition, for choices towards the in-group or the out-group 
(p = 0.23, p = 0.88, respectively).
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in-group and out-group, respectively. ‘Recipr. In-group’ and Recipr. Out-group’ define reciprocity rates in an analogous way. Bars include 95% confidence 
intervals.
Fig. 5. Inmates’ decisions in the PD, neutral vs. priming treatment. ‘Cooperation In-group’ and ‘Cooperation Out-group’ denote cooperation rates with a 
partner from the in-group and out-group, respectively.
Fig. 6. Inmates’ classification of types in the EET (Spiteful, Altruistic, Inequality Averse, Inequality Loving), neutral vs. priming treatment. Bars show percent-
age of subjects classified into each type and include 95% confidence intervals.
Result 2: The priming intervention increases the pro-social behavior of inmates towards the out-group by leading to higher levels of 
trust, reciprocity and cooperation. On the contrary, the intervention does not significantly alter the distribution of types in the EET and 
it has no effect on behavior towards the in-group.
160 L. Balafoutas et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 119 (2020) 148–171Table 4
Choices in the experimental games, by coded category of inmates’ account.
Coded category of inmates’ accounts
Time in prison Social behavior None
Trust Game:
Trust in-group 36.4 60.0 80.0
Trust out-group 72.7 60.0 0.0
Reciprocity in-group 50.0 72.7 50.0
Reciprocity out-group 87.5 36.4 0.0
Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Cooperation in-group 46.7 50.0 54.5
Cooperation out-group 63.3 18.8 0.0
Equality Equivalence Test:
Spiteful in-group 16.7 25.0 27.3
Spiteful out-group 16.7 18.8 18.2
Inequality averse in-group 36.7 31.3 45.5
Inequality averse out-group 46.7 31.3 27.3
Altruistic in-group 16.7 18.8 18.2
Altruistic out-group 13.3 6.3 27.3
Inequality loving in-group 30.0 25.0 9.1
Inequality loving out-group 23.3 43.8 27.3
Notes: All values represent percentages. Trust measures the % of first movers 
who trust in the TG; Reciprocity measures the % of second movers who recipro-
cate in the TG; Cooperation measures the % of subjects who cooperate in the PD; 
Spiteful, Inequality averse, Altruistic, Inequality loving measure the % of subjects 
classified in each of the four categories in the EET. N = 33, N = 13, N = 11 for 
the categories ‘Time in prison’, ‘Social behavior’, ‘None’, respectively.
In the priming task inmates were asked to reflect about their time in prison and to think about their social behavior. 
Thus, the priming manipulation may have activated different concepts. One way to address this issue is to analyze the 
content of inmates’ accounts in the priming task in order to identify the concepts activated by priming. For this purpose, we 
employed two independent research assistants and asked them to read all accounts in the priming treatment and to indicate 
for each account whether it refers to time spent in prison, social behavior, or none of the these concepts. Each assistant, 
independently, coded all accounts. The two codings are very highly correlated (Spearman’s ρ = 0.82, p < 0.01, N = 57), 
leading to a scale reliability coefficient (Crohnbach’s alpha) of 0.89. The two assistants met and jointly decided on a common 
coding in all cases of disagreement. Based on this method, we classified all accounts into one of the following categories: 
(i) accounts referring to time spent in prison, (ii) accounts referring to social behavior, (iii) accounts referring to none of the 
previous two concepts.19
Of 57 scripts, the majority (33 scripts, or 58%) were coded as primarily related to time spent in prison, 13 (23%) were 
coded as primarily related to social behavior, and 11 (19%) as related to none of the two. This already suggests that time in 
prison was the most prominent concept activated by priming. Moreover, in order to give an impression of how the priming 
effects are related to script content, in Table 4 we present behavior in the three experimental games, disaggregated by 
category of coded script.
Table 4 suggests that the main finding with respect to the effect of priming – the increase in pro-sociality towards 
the out-group – is driven by those inmates who wrote about time spent in prison in their scripts. In the dimension of 
trust, those inmates trust the out-group 72.7% of the time, compared to only 36.4% who trust the in-group. The pattern is 
very similar in the dimension of reciprocity (87.5% are reciprocal towards the out-group compared with 50% towards the 
in-group) and cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma (63.3% cooperate with the out-group and 46.7% with the in-group). All 
these differences are reversed among those inmates who wrote about social behavior in their scripts, and also among those 
who wrote about neither time spent in prison nor social behavior (noting, however, that all numbers in these two categories 
are based on very few observations and should thus be interpreted with caution). Finally, consistent with the absence of 
treatment differences in EET classification between the primed and neutral group (see Fig. 6), we find that the proportions 
of the four distributional preference types are typically quite similar across coded categories. Again, these figures are based 
on very few observations per distributional preference type and are therefore likely to be imprecise.
It is evident from the numbers shown in Table 4 that scripts referring to time spent in prison lead to very high levels of 
pro-sociality towards the out-group in the dimensions of trust, reciprocity and cooperation, helping us to better understand 
how the priming intervention worked. This analysis also hints towards the possibility that our findings actually represent a 
lower bound of the effects that an intervention would have if it only asked inmates to think about their time in prison.
19 A fourth possible category would include accounts referring to both, time spent in prison and social behavior. Given that this category cannot be useful 
in disentangling the effects of the two types of accounts, we asked our assistants to decide which of the two concepts featured more prominently in the 
respective account for all such cases.
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Econometric analysis.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Trust Trust Recipr. Recipr. Cooper. Cooper. x-score x-score y-score y-score
Out-group −0.222∗ −0.112 −0.571∗∗∗ −0.483∗∗∗ −0.396∗∗∗ −0.238∗∗ −0.208 0.021 0.208 0.006
(0.125) (0.163) (0.134) (0.163) (0.093) (0.114) (0.345) (0.439) (0.328) (0.406)
Priming 0.061 −0.031 −0.114 −0.050 −0.134 −0.153 −0.485 −0.533 0.612 0.899∗
(0.125) (0.142) (0.138) (0.158) (0.094) (0.103) (0.419) (0.471) (0.447) (0.471)
Out-group* Priming 0.347∗∗ 0.380∗∗ 0.411∗∗ 0.343∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.305∗∗ 0.542 0.410 −0.226 −0.187
(0.170) (0.183) (0.181) (0.201) (0.126) (0.133) (0.468) (0.512) (0.446) (0.474)
Time Served −0.018 0.021 0.001 0.035 −0.198∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.023) (0.014) (0.063) (0.063)
Out-group* −0.024 −0.008 −0.037∗∗ −0.028 0.013
Time Served (0.023) (0.028) (0.018) (0.068) (0.063)
Penalty −0.007 0.020∗∗ −0.004 0.006 −0.029
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.026) (0.027)
High Security −0.167 −0.721∗∗ 0.133 −0.294 1.423
(0.308) (0.332) (0.205) (1.026) (1.059)
Married 0.045 −0.184 0.147 0.289 −0.154
(0.126) (0.192) (0.091) (0.457) (0.471)
Number of Cell Mates −0.099∗∗ −0.026 −0.030 0.120 0.141
(0.039) (0.048) (0.027) (0.135) (0.139)
Age 0.002 −0.011 −0.007 0.052∗∗ −0.015
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.026) (0.026)
Education −0.045 −0.103 −0.005 0.012 −0.400∗
(0.062) (0.087) (0.046) (0.228) (0.235)
Number of Children 0.043 0.073 0.020 −0.282∗ −0.090
(0.037) (0.083) (0.033) (0.160) (0.165)
Number of Siblings 0.019∗ −0.029 −0.009 0.050 −0.030
(0.011) (0.022) (0.009) (0.046) (0.047)
Drug Related Offences −0.167 0.055 0.210∗∗ −0.241 0.684
(0.117) (0.135) (0.084) (0.421) (0.435)
Smuggling Goods 0.805∗ 0.351∗ −0.046 −0.906 1.573∗
(0.428) (0.211) (0.161) (0.807) (0.832)
Human Trafficking −0.071 −0.128 0.220∗ −0.602 0.265
(0.157) (0.256) (0.121) (0.608) (0.627)
Homicide 0.825 −0.839∗∗ 0.315 0.714 1.569
(0.532) (0.422) (0.318) (1.595) (1.645)
Sexual Crime −0.156 0.261 −0.021 1.092 0.153
(0.277) (0.433) (0.214) (1.074) (1.108)
Economic Crime 0.195 0.105 0.075 −1.475∗∗ 0.496
(0.185) (0.263) (0.139) (0.698) (0.721)
Firearms violations 0.305 −0.308 −0.020 −1.436∗ 1.025
(0.202) (0.405) (0.167) (0.836) (0.863)
N 118 102 92 84 210 186 210 186 210 186
Priming + Out-group* 
Priming








n/a −0.042** n/a 0.013 n/a −0.037∗∗∗ n/a 0.006 n/a −0.185∗∗∗
Notes: All specifications are estimated with linear probability models and include subject random effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Independent 
variables as defined in the text and in footnote 16. Last three rows present joint coefficients and significance levels for tests on the restriction that the 
respective joint coefficient is equal to zero. N varies across specifications depending on the number of available observations (59 inmates as first movers, 
46 inmates as second movers in the TG; data on control variables for some inmates missing in full specifications). ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
5. Econometric analysis of inmates’ decisions
In this section we use multivariate regression models in order to offer a richer and more nuanced analysis of the out-
comes of interest. The dependent variables in Table 5 are trusting rates from the TG (columns 1-2), reciprocity rates from 
the TG (columns 3-4), cooperation rates in the PD (columns 5-6), as well as benevolence in the domain of advantageous 
and disadvantageous inequality (columns 7-10). All specifications show estimates from linear probability models. However, 
in Appendix A (Table A.2) we also estimate Probit models (in columns 1-6) and ordered Probit models (for columns 7-10) 
and confirm that our results remain qualitatively unchanged. Given that each inmate made two decisions in each game 
(one for the in-group and one for the out-group), all specifications include individual random effects. For each dependent 
variable, we estimate one parsimonious specification aimed at confirming Results 1 and 2 by means of the right-hand side 
dummy variables Out-group (equal to 1 if the matched partner is not a prisoner) and Priming (equal to 1 if the inmate 
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present a full specification that includes a number of potentially relevant control variables.
Among these variables, of particular interest for our research questions is Time Served, which is provided by the prison 
administration and measures (in years) the time spent by an inmate at the current prison.20 The coefficient of this variable 
provides an estimate of the effect of time spent in prison on social behavior, and can thus be interpreted as an estimate of 
a rehabilitation effect. In order to account for the fact that a longer time served, as well as behavior in our experimental 
games are simultaneously determined by a lower pro-social inclination, we include in all regressions the variable Penalty, 
which measures the total sentence and, therefore, controls for the possibility that more antisocial prisoners have been 
longer in prison simply due to a longer initial sentence. To further account for unobservable characteristics related to 
pro-social inclination, we include dummy variables for the various kinds of crimes committed by the inmates (as defined in 
section 4.1). Robbery is the omitted category in the regressions.21 Further control variables include the number of inmates 
with whom the cell is shared, as well as the inmate’s age and marital status. All standard errors are clustered at the session 
level.
The first thing to note in the regressions is that Result 1 is fully confirmed for all games, both in the parsimonious and 
in the full specifications. In particular, the negative and highly significant coefficients for Out-group in the reciprocity and 
cooperation regressions confirm the presence of discrimination against the sample of non-prisoners. The magnitude of the 
effect of discrimination is striking: depending on specification, non-primed inmates are between 48% and 57% less likely to 
reciprocate towards a member of the out-group than towards another inmate, and they are between 24% and 40% less likely 
to cooperate with the out-group. There is also some weak evidence that inmates are less trusting towards the out-group, 
but this effect vanishes once the full set of controls is included.
Turning to the effect of priming (Result 2), again the regression estimates are fully in line with the non-parametric anal-
ysis of section 4.3. Priming has an insignificant coefficient in columns 1-6, indicating that the priming intervention does 
not affect inmates’ behavior towards other inmates with respect to trust, reciprocity, and cooperation. On the contrary, the 
coefficient of the interaction term Out-group*Priming is always positive and significant for these dimensions, confirming that 
priming affects behavior towards the out-group in a qualitatively different way than towards the in-group. The joint coeffi-
cients (Priming + Out-group* Priming), shown at the bottom of Table 5, capture the effect of the intervention on behavior 
towards the out-group, and these coefficients are positive, of large magnitude (ranging between 15% for cooperation rates 
and about 30%-40% for trust and reciprocity rates) and significant in five of six specifications for these three dimensions. 
Another way of looking at the effect of priming on discrimination is by means of the joint coefficients (Out-group + Out-
group*Priming), which are smaller and generally insignificant, revealing that no systematic discrimination can be detected 
among primed inmates. A single exception is the positive joint coefficient in column (2), which suggests that some reverse 
discrimination may be present, in the form of higher trust rates towards the out-group.
With respect to distributional preferences, our regressions can provide some additional information compared to the 
non-parametric analysis of section 4.3. This is due to the fact that in Table 5 the dependent variable is not the individual 
type, but the strength of benevolence (or malevolence) towards another individual as measured by the x-score (columns 7-8) 
and the y-score (columns 9-10). This allows us to always use the full sample (pooling all types together) and it also allows 
documenting and exploiting changes in revealed benevolence that are not large enough to result in changes in type. The 
regression results suggest that priming affects the pro-sociality of inmates towards their in-group in two different directions: 
negatively in the domain of disadvantageous inequality (x-scores) and positively in the domain of advantageous inequality 
(y-scores). Casual inspection of the type classification in Fig. 6 is in line with these effects, since both can explain the lower 
prevalence of inequality loving types when primed inmates play the EET with an in-group member. However, while quite 
sizeable, the coefficients are insignificant (with the partial exception of column 10). Given the absence of discrimination in 
the neutral group (see the coefficients for Out-group in columns 7-10) and the insignificant impact of priming on inmates’ 
behavior, it is no surprise that we also fail to find any discrimination against the out-group among primed inmates (joint 
coefficients Out-group + Out-group* Priming).
In addition to providing further support for our main results, the regressions of Table 5 allow us to estimate in the five 
full specifications the effect of spending time in prison (controlling for the total sentence), as measured by the variable Time 
Served. The coefficient of this variable is generally insignificant with the exception of specification (10), suggesting that a 
longer time spent in prison reduces benevolence when lying ahead of another participant but does not affect behavior in the 
other domains. However, this coefficient captures the effect of time served on behavior towards the in-group: the picture 
changes if we examine the joint coefficient (Time Served + Out-group*Time Served), which is again significantly negative 
in the y-score regression of column (10), but in addition has a significant negative coefficient in the trust regression in 
20 For most prisoners we also have data on the total time spent in prison over their lifetime. However, we do not use these data for our analysis since, 
contrary to time served in the current prison, they are self-reported and prison administration has indicated that there is no reliable way of confirming the 
accuracy of these data.
21 To have an ordering of the various offences with respect to their severity, we ran simple linear regressions of the total penalty on each category 
independently. The offences are ordered as follows (in ascending order of severity): Robbery, smuggling goods, sexual crime, economic crime, firearms 
violations, drug related offences, human trafficking, homicide. Hence, the omitted category of robbery is the least severe offence. These results remain 
practically unchanged if we run a multivariate regression with all crime type dummies included simultaneously.
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prison generally reduces pro-social behavior towards the out-group. From a policy perspective this is quite worrying, since 
it suggests that pro-social motivation among inmates seems to wane over time, possibly rendering their re-integration after 
release particularly problematic. Our priming intervention is offering a way to counter-balance this negative effect of time 
spent in prison, given that it has already been shown to increase pro-sociality, especially towards the out-group.
Result 3: A longer time spent in prison is associated with lower trust and cooperation rates towards the out-group, as well as decreased 
benevolence towards both groups when lying ahead of another participant.
While the independent variables Out-group and Priming that have been used to analyze discrimination and the effects of 
priming are by design exogenous as part of the experiment, a potential concern with Time Served is that it may suffer from a 
simultaneity bias that would impede causal inference on how time spent in prison affects pro-social behavior in the Table 5
regressions. Hence, although the regressions include a number of variables to account for this possibility, causality cannot 
be established with certainty and these results must be interpreted with caution. As an additional step in this respect, we 
have also estimated two-stage least squares versions of the five full specifications. In those regressions we use the following 
two instruments for Time Served: the frequency of leaving prison (measured in days per month) and the number of days 
per month doing some work in the facility. Both variables are likely to correlate with the time spent in prison (for instance, 
because they depend on the total sentence received or because certain privileges are only awarded after completing part 
of the sentence), while they are unlikely determinants of behavior in our experimental games.23 In terms of instrument 
strength, we note that working days per month – but not the frequency of leaving prison – is a significant predictor of time 
served in all first stage regressions, and that testing for instrument strength based on first stage F statistics (following Stock 
and Yogo, 2005) rejects the null hypothesis of weak instruments in all but one (the reciprocity) specification.
Our main results remain robust to instrumental variables estimation, painting a consistent picture with respect to the 
negative effects of time spent in prison on pro-social behavior, primarily towards the out-group: the significant negative 
effects of Time Served persist for the y-score (both towards the in-group and the out-group), as well as in the dimensions 
of trust and cooperation towards the out-group. However, we relegate this analysis to Table A.3 in Appendix A, due to the 
fact that Wu-Hausman tests of endogeneity fail to reject the null hypothesis that Time Served can be treated as exogenous, 
albeit with one exception in the regression on y-scores (see bottom of Table A.3 for details on tests of endogeneity and of 
over-identifying restrictions).
In terms of further control variables (Penalty, High Security, Number of Cell Mates, Age, socioeconomic controls and the 
crime categories), we note that out of 75 estimated coefficients for these variables in columns (2), (4), (6), (8) and (10) of 
Table 5, only 16 are significant at least at the 10% level, and only the variable Smuggling Goods is significant in more than 
two specifications. For instance, the most severe crime of homicide is associated with significantly lower reciprocity levels 
but has positive and insignificant coefficients in all other specifications. Overall, it is hard to discern any systematic pattern 
regarding the pro-sociality attributed to different types of committed crimes. Inmates from the high security prison are, 
ceteris paribus, less reciprocal, but there are no significant differences between the two prisons in any other dimension – 
which may, however, also be due to the small sample in the high security prison.
6. Discussion and conclusion
This paper presents evidence on the social behavior of prison inmates, with the aim of characterizing this behavior and 
also of evaluating a priming intervention and its potential to promote a positive rehabilitation effect. We have run economic 
experiments with a sample of 105 inmates in a low- and a high security prison in Greece. We have provided a general 
landscape of inmates’ social behavior and studied how this varies between the in-group of inmates and the out-group of 
people outside prison, finding substantial evidence of discrimination expressed in lower rates of reciprocity and cooperation 
towards the out-group. Furthermore, we have used a simple priming technique that asks inmates to reflect on their time 
spent in prison and how it has affected them: the results indicate that this priming intervention has a substantial impact 
on inmates’ choices, generally promoting pro-social behavior towards the out-group and eliminating discrimination.
We believe that our findings can be very useful to policy makers who are in charge of evaluating the impact of incar-
ceration on social behavior and the likelihood of successful post-release re-integration, especially in light of the controversy 
surrounding the way that prisons affect inmates during and after incarceration. While our results generally point towards 
a negative effect of time spent in prison on pro-social behavior (evinced by lower cooperation rates when interacting with 
the out-group and by lower y-scores), the strong positive effect of our priming intervention suggests that rehabilitation can 
22 We have also estimated versions of all regressions that include an interaction term between time served and priming, as well as the three-way inter-
action term Out-group*Priming*Time Served. The interaction between time served and priming is always insignificant with one exception (the cooperation 
regression), while the three-way interaction term is always insignificant and small in magnitude. The results are available from the authors upon request.
23 We must, however, acknowledge that this analysis must be interpreted with caution since instrument exogeneity cannot be tested. Sargan’s tests of 
overidentifying restrictions, reported in Table A.3, do not reject the null hypothesis that all instruments are exogenous, under the assumption that at least 
one of them is exogenous.
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encouraging results – which are, however, subject to a number of limitations discussed in what follows.
What are possible channels driving the positive effect of the priming intervention in our study? The reasoning behind our 
hypothesis H2 proposes a mechanism based on concerns for group reputation, which are stronger in the priming treatment 
that enhances the participants’ identification with the prisoner group. We have already shown that the prisoner’s identity 
significantly increases in strength as a result of priming, which is consistent with our story. However, further possible 
mechanisms for the effect of priming should be acknowledged. First, it seems plausible that emotions evoked by the priming 
task may be driving the effects. For instance, the pattern we observe in the data (stronger identification with the prisoners’ 
group and stronger pro-sociality towards the out-group in the priming treatment) seems quite reasonable if identification 
with the in-group is associated with generally negative feelings and experiences, such that inmates who are asked to reflect 
about their time in prison regret sharing this particular identity and become more inclined to behave benevolently towards 
the group from outside prison (for instance, in an attempt to shed this criminal identity, or to partly compensate for 
previous criminal behavior). Referring to the content analysis presented in section 3, this interpretation is in line with the 
much higher frequency of primed inmates’ accounts of their time in prison being classified as generally negative, compared 
to the neutral group accounts (50% vs. 8.5%; χ2 = 20.33, p < 0.01, N = 101).
In a similar vein, the positive effect of priming on pro-social behavior towards the out-group may be associated with 
subordination towards the depriving out-group (Giles and Powesland, 1975). If inmates consider society as a depriving 
out-group, then they may develop a stronger inclination to behave benevolently towards this group when their prisoner’s 
identity is made more salient. This explanation is supported by the presence of reverse discrimination among primed 
inmates in the dimensions of trust and benevolence under disadvantageous inequality.
A final possibility is that the priming intervention evokes among inmates the rehabilitation effect that it aims to test. 
For instance, introspection may lead inmates to consider the purpose that their incarceration is meant to serve, and to 
realize that imprisonment can only be meaningful if it can lead to successful re-integration by modifying pro- and antisocial 
behavior. A related interpretation suggests that the effects of priming are driven by a social desirability bias: if inmates 
understand that the intervention is meant to test their rehabilitation, they may adjust their choices to fit the expected 
pattern of successful rehabilitation and increased pro-sociality towards the out-of-prison sample. Regardless of the precise 
mechanism driving our findings, the fact that the intervention works is very encouraging and suggests that perhaps further, 
related interventions, may have the capacity to modify inmates’ behavior.
Given that participation in the experiments was voluntary, issues of selection into the sample may potentially play a 
role. In order to alleviate such concerns and assess the extent to which our sample is representative of the general prison 
population, we compare certain observable characteristics in our sample and among all prisoners in Greece and in the 
United States. The first characteristic is the distribution of nationalities, differentiating between Greeks and foreigners. For 
this analysis we use data from the Greek Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights24 and find that in our sample, 
as well as in the prison population in Greece as a whole, foreigners are a majority (70% and 58%, respectively). The second 
characteristic is the type of crime committed by inmates, for which we have no suitable data for Greek prisons and therefore 
use U.S. data from the Federal Bureau of Prisons.25 Table A.4 in Appendix A shows that the distribution of crime categories 
is similar between our sample and the U.S. aggregate data, although it should be taken into account that the definitions of 
various categories do not completely overlap. Finally, from the same source we have data on the mean age of prisoners in 
the U.S. (38.4 years), which is very similar to the average age of 36 years in our sample.
The experimental methods used in this study inevitably suffer from certain limitations, thus only allowing us to draw 
indirect evidence on our research questions. The data are based on behavior in simple economic games, which is only a 
proxy for criminal or pro-social behavior in the field. Moreover, behavior is recorded before release from prison, meaning 
that the evidence on how inmates treat non-inmates refers to a point in time prior to actual encounters between the two 
groups. It should also be kept in mind that, given imperfections in the legal system, it cannot be ruled out that some of the 
inmates in our sample have been wrongly convicted.
An additional limitation of our study is that it paints a static picture of inmates’ behavior, documenting their behavior 
at one point in time and using econometric techniques in order to estimate an effect of time spent in prison on behavior. 
Relatedly, we cannot be sure about the extent to which the strong positive effects of priming documented in our experiment 
persist in the long run, given that priming effects are often short-lived. An alternative method could thus be to identify the 
effect of imprisonment and of priming interventions by following inmates over time and documenting changes in their 
behavior during their sentence as well as after their release from prison. While this can be challenging due to issues of 
attrition over time and biases resulting from repeated measurement of social preferences, we consider it a very promising 
avenue for future research.
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Appendix A
A.1. Comparison between inmates and students
We begin by noting that we observe some similarities between the two samples, since around 30% of participants have a 
Greek nationality and the rest have a variety of nationalities dominated by Arab and Eastern European countries (proportion 
of Greek prisoners: 29.5% in prisons vs. 24.5% in MAICH; χ2 = 0.06, p = 0.81, N = 145). On the other hand, a difference 
is that participants are on average older among the inmate population: mean age in the student group is 26.77 (s.d. =
5.18) and in the group of inmates it is 35.97 (s.d. = 9.47). In any case, we are presenting evidence from two different 
cohorts of the population, not only in terms of certain sociodemographic features, but also due to obvious differences in 
life experiences and in particular the current social and professional situation. Thus, our rationale when comparing the two 
samples is not to isolate or causally estimate some sort of ‘prison’ effect; the purpose of this exercise is solely to show 
how the behavior of our focus group of prison inmates compares to a type of population typically studied in economic 
experiments (a student sample), and sharing a few common features with the prison population (close interactions among 
participants who eat, sleep and work together in the study site; similar distribution of nationalities; geographic proximity).
Fig. A.1 shows the results from the trust game. Overall, inmates trust significantly less than students (42.4% vs. 60%; 
χ2 = 3.73, p = 0.05, N = 158). They also exhibit somewhat less reciprocal behavior as second movers, but the difference is 
not significant (χ2 = 2.41, p = 0.12, N = 132).
Fig. A.2 shows the results from the prisoner’s dilemma. The frequency of cooperative choices is very similar across the 
two samples; 43.33% of inmates and 40% of our student group cooperate. These proportions are statistically indistinguishable 
from each other (χ2 = 0.26, p = 0.61, N = 290).
Finally, Fig. A.3 gives clear evidence that the distribution of distributional preference types differ between the two sam-
ples. While approximately 20% of inmates and students are classified as spiteful (χ2 = 0.08, p = 0.93, N = 290), inmates 
are about half as likely as students to be classified as altruistic (14.3% vs. 28.8%; χ2 = 6.61, p = 0.01, N = 290), indicat-
ing lower benevolence. Similarly, the ratio of inequality averse subjects is slightly significantly higher among students than 
among inmates (χ2 = 3.25, p = 0.07, N = 290). As already noted, a striking feature of the distribution of types among pris-
oners is the very high prevalence of inequality loving types, which is more than six times higher than among students 
(χ2 = 22.09, p = 0.01, N = 290).
The following result summarizes the observed differences in the social behavior of inmates compared to the group of 
students.
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Fig. A.3. Inmates’ and students’ classification of types (Spiteful, Altruistic, Inequality Averse, Inequality Loving) in the EET. Bars show the percentage of 
subjects classified into each type and include 95% confidence intervals.
Result A1: Inmates trust less and are less altruistic, less inequality averse and more inequality loving than students. No significant 
differences between the two samples are found in cooperation and reciprocity rates.
A.2. Additional tables
Table A.1
Distribution of language of instructions and of the priming text.
Language N % N % N %
Instructions
ARABIC 20 19.05 7 14.58 13 22.81
ENGLISH 6 5.71 3 6.25 3 5.26
FRENCH 2 1.90 2 4.17 0 0.00
GREEK 77 73.33 36 75.00 41 71.93
Priming text
ARABIC 26 24.76 12 25.00 14 24.56
ENGLISH 6 5.71 4 8.33 2 3.51
GREEK 65 61.90 29 60.42 36 63.16
SPANISH 5 4.76 1 2.08 4 7.02
TURKISH 1 0.95 0 0.00 1 1.75
URDU 2 1.90 2 4.17 0 0.00
L. Balafoutas et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 119 (2020) 148–171 167Table A.2
Econometric analysis with discrete choice models.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Trust Trust Recipr. Recipr. Cooper. Cooper. x-score x-score y-score y-score
Out-group −0.707∗ −0.351 −1.823∗∗∗ −1.574∗∗∗ −1.162∗∗∗ −0.705∗∗ −0.132 −0.005 0.153 0.021
(0.391) (0.502) (0.537) (0.552) (0.304) (0.345) (0.246) (0.312) (0.274) (0.335)
Priming 0.166 −0.140 −0.345 −0.158 −0.373 −0.448 −0.338 −0.344 0.506 0.718∗∗
(0.354) (0.428) (0.435) (0.479) (0.274) (0.288) (0.307) (0.319) (0.372) (0.366)
Out-group* Priming 1.047∗∗ 1.299∗∗ 1.365∗∗ 1.103 0.869∗∗ 0.968∗∗ 0.404 0.318 −0.143 −0.162
(0.516) (0.585) (0.631) (0.673) (0.384) (0.413) (0.340) (0.361) (0.368) (0.392)
Time Served −0.055 0.075 0.002 0.0115 −0.138∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.079) (0.038) (0.043) (0.049)
Out-group* −0.105 −0.047 −0.136∗∗ −0.013 0.011
Time Served (0.084) (0.099) (0.059) (0.050) (0.054)
Penalty −0.033 0.087∗∗ −0.011 0.007 −0.027
(0.032) (0.042) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021)
High Security −0.583 −3.062∗ 0.352 −0.408 1.694∗
(0.962) (1.584) (0.554) (0.713) (0.988)
Married 0.182 −0.721 0.446∗ 0.231 −0.165
(0.374) (0.616) (0.265) (0.295) (0.342)
Number of Cell Mates −0.338∗∗∗ −0.056 −0.099 0.088 0.115
(0.131) (0.147) (0.075) (0.090) (0.105)
Age 0.014 −0.041 −0.021 0.035∗∗ −0.014
(0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019)
Education −0.154 −0.308 −0.0183 −0.012 −0.372∗∗
(0.187) (0.276) (0.134) (0.152) (0.180)
Number of Children 0.108 0.258 0.0513 −0.208∗∗ −0.035
(0.116) (0.268) (0.099) (0.104) (0.116)
Number of Siblings 0.065∗ −0.092 −0.034 0.043 −0.025
(0.039) (0.073) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033)
Drug Related Offences −0.592 0.239 0.610∗∗ −0.220 0.657∗∗
(0.384) (0.421) (0.240) (0.278) (0.328)
Smuggling Goods 1.101∗ −0.109 −0.758 2.105∗∗
(0.637) (0.466) (0.562) (0.879)
Human Trafficking −0.197 −0.685 0.650∗ −0.536 0.233
(0.526) (0.815) (0.357) (0.425) (0.501)
Homicide 3.224 −3.776 0.951 0.236 1.391
(2.113) (2.670) (0.866) (1.003) (1.175)
Sexual Crime −0.439 0.768 0.0240 0.657 0.166
(0.821) (1.374) (0.571) (0.689) (0.745)
Economic Crime 0.589 0.378 0.206 −1.283∗∗ 0.593
(0.558) (0.788) (0.398) (0.547) (0.564)
Firearms violations 0.825 −0.187 −1.024∗ 0.590
(0.643) (0.496) (0.578) (0.658)
N 118 100 92 82 210 186 210 186 210 186
Priming + Out-group* 
Priming








n/a −0.159** n/a 0.029 n/a −0.134*** n/a −0.001 n/a −0.126***
Notes: Columns (1)-(6) present estimates from Probit regressions; columns (7)-(10) present estimates from ordered Probit regressions. Standard errors in 
parentheses. All specifications include subject random effects. Independent variables as defined in the text and in footnote 16. Last three rows present p
values from tests on the restriction that the respective joint coefficient is equal to zero. N varies across specifications depending on the number of available 
observations (59 inmates as first movers, 46 inmates as second movers in the TG; data on control variables for some inmates missing in full specifications). 
Coefficient on Smuggling Goods missing in (2) since there were only two inmates in the role of the trustor and with that particular offence, leading this 
variable to perfectly predict success in the Probit model. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Two-stage least squares estimation.
1 2 3 4 5
Trust Reciprocity Cooperation x-score y-score
Out-group −0.041 −0.657∗∗∗ −0.270∗∗ 0.451 −0.693
(0.164) (0.195) (0.129) (0.583) (0.595)
Priming −0.003 0.017 −0.152 −0.555 0.934∗∗
(0.130) (0.159) (0.097) (0.438) (0.447)
Out-group*Priming 0.369∗∗ 0.249 0.303∗∗ 0.434 −0.226
(0.165) (0.210) (0.130) (0.589) (0.602)
Time Served 0.004 −0.075 −0.011 0.181 −0.435∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.062) (0.025) (0.115) (0.117)
Out-group*Time Served −0.042 0.070 −0.027 −0.160 0.227∗
(0.028) (0.055) (0.026) (0.119) (0.121)
Penalty −0.006 0.0160∗ −0.004 0.009 −0.033
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.022) (0.022)
High Security −0.188 −0.760∗∗ 0.130 −0.250 1.352
(0.277) (0.316) (0.186) (0.841) (0.859)
Married 0.068 −0.345∗ 0.137 0.420 −0.369
(0.115) (0.207) (0.085) (0.385) (0.393)
Number of Cell Mates −0.095∗∗∗ −0.034 −0.030 0.125 0.132
(0.036) (0.045) (0.024) (0.111) (0.113)
Age 0.002 −0.004 −0.006 0.050∗∗ −0.011
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.021) (0.021)
Education −0.064 −0.127 −0.003 −0.025 −0.340∗
(0.059) (0.084) (0.042) (0.189) (0.193)
Number of Children 0.036 0.108 0.021 −0.297∗∗ −0.066
(0.034) (0.081) (0.029) (0.131) (0.134)
Number of Siblings 0.017∗ −0.022 −0.009 0.045 −0.022
(0.010) (0.021) (0.008) (0.037) (0.038)
Drug Related Offences −0.167 0.126 0.212∗∗∗ −0.271 0.733∗∗
(0.105) (0.135) (0.076) (0.346) (0.353)
Smuggling Goods 0.839∗∗ 0.280 −0.060 −0.718 1.268∗
(0.387) (0.205) (0.149) (0.673) (0.687)
Human Trafficking −0.112 −0.145 0.230∗∗ −0.734 0.480
(0.147) (0.243) (0.112) (0.506) (0.517)
Homicide 0.704 −0.769∗ 0.336 0.434 2.025
(0.494) (0.402) (0.291) (1.320) (1.348)
Sexual Crime −0.203 0.114 −0.018 1.051 0.220
(0.254) (0.421) (0.194) (0.880) (0.899)
Economic Crime 0.182 0.244 0.0834 −1.584∗∗∗ 0.672
(0.167) (0.264) (0.127) (0.577) (0.589)
Firearms violations 0.249 −0.387 −0.004 −1.650∗∗ 1.374∗
(0.190) (0.387) (0.155) (0.700) (0.715)
N 102 84 186 186 186
Priming + Out-group* Priming 0.366*** 0.266* 0.151 −0.121 0.708
Out-group + Out-group* Priming 0.328** −0.408* 0.033 0.885 −0.919
Time Served + Out-group*Time Served −0.038** −0.005 −0.038*** 0.021 −0.208***
Sargan’s Test of overidentifying restrictions p = 0.360 p = 0.382 p = 0.138 p = 0.931 p = 0.904
Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity p = 0.386 p = 0.105 p = 0.637 p = 0.157 p = 0.020
Notes: Instrumented variable: Time Served. Used instruments: frequency of leaving prison (days per month), working days per 
month. Standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables as defined in the text and in footnote 16. Last three rows present 
p values from tests on the restriction that the respective joint coefficient is equal to zero. N varies across specifications de-
pending on the number of available observations (59 inmates as first movers, 46 inmates as second movers in the TG; data on 
control variables and instruments for some inmates missing). ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
respectively.
Table A.4
Distribution of crime categories in our sample and among U.S. prison population (Source: Federal Bureau of Prisons.
Our sample U.S. prison population
Category % of total % of total
Drug related 40.9 Drug offenses 46.3
Robbery 34.3 Burglary, Larceny, Property Offenses, Robbery 8.5
Homicide 6.7 Homicide, Aggravated Assault, and Kidnapping Offenses 3.2
Sexual crime 2.9 Sex offenses 9.1
Economic crime 7.6 Banking and Insurance, Counterfeit, Embezzlement, 
Extortion, Fraud, Bribery
6.7
Firearms violations 5.7 Weapons, Explosives, Arson 17.2
Others (Smuggling goods, human trafficking) 18.1 Continuing Criminal Enterprise, Courts or corrections, 
Immigrations, National Security, Miscellaneous
9.0
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Fig. A.4. Decisions in the TG taken by students. Trust is measured as the percentage of first movers who choose to trust in the TG; reciprocity is measured 
as the percentage of second movers who choose to reciprocate in the TG. Bars include 95% confidence intervals.
Fig. A.5. Decisions in the PD taken by students. Bars indicate cooperation rates and include 95% confidence intervals.
Fig. A.6. Classification of students’ types (Spiteful, Altruistic, Inequality Averse, Inequality Loving) in the EET. Bars show the percentage of subjects classified 
into each type and include 95% confidence intervals.
170 L. Balafoutas et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 119 (2020) 148–171Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at https://doi .org /10 .1016 /j .geb .2019 .10 .009.
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